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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Gregory Clark Miller appeals from his sentence and denial of his Rule 35 
motion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Miller repeatedly touched the genitals of two eight-year-old 
granddaughters.  (PSI, pp. 3-4.)  The state charged him with lewd conduct. 
(R., pp. 33-34.)  Miller pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.  
(R., pp. 38-47.)  The district court imposed a sentence of 12 years with two years 
determinate.  (R., pp. 52-54.) 
 Fourteen days after entry of judgment Miller filed a Rule 35 motion 
seeking reduction of his sentence.  (R., pp. 59-62.)  The district court denied the 
motion, concluding it was 
persuaded that the primary objective of protecting society and the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution are best 
achieved by imposing a period of incarceration.  Miller’s 
granddaughters, both eight years of age at the time of the offense, 
have been greatly harmed, and a period of incarceration is 
necessary to both punish Miller and act as a deterrent to others in 
the community who would commit similar crimes.  Suspending 
Miller’s prison time and placing him on probation, as requested in 
the Rule 35 motion, would minimize the seriousness of his crime 
and the harm suffered by his young granddaughters. 
 
(R., p. 65.)  Miller filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his Rule 35 






 Miller states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the trial court err in the manner it sentenced Mr. Miller? 
 
B. Did the trial court err by its order denying Rule 35 sentence 
reduction entered March 29, 2016? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (capitalization altered).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Miller failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
 
2. Has Miller failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 












 The district court imposed a sentence of 12 years with two years 
determinate upon Miller’s conviction for lewd conduct with two of his 
granddaughters.  (R., pp. 52-54.)  On appeal Miller argues the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion because the sentence is “excessive” and a 
“misapplication” of sentencing factors because it “disproportionally emphasize[s] 
punishment over the various other factors.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Miller’s 
argument is without merit, primarily because it relies upon a fabricated quote as 
its legal standard.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion 
standard.”  State v. Al–Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 70, 106 P.3d 392, 396 (2005).  The 
appellate court independently reviews the record, “having due regard for the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the 
public interest.”  State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002).  
“In order to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, the defendant 
must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under 
any reasonable view of the facts.”  State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 73, 44 P.3d 




its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008). 
 
C. Review Of The Record Shows No Abuse Of Discretion By The District 
Court 
 
 In determining whether the sentencing court abused its discretion, the 
appellate court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the case.  State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 143, 814 P.2d 401, 403 (1991).  To show an abuse 
of discretion the defendant must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive, considering any view of the facts.  Id. at 145, 814 P.2d 
at 405. The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment, are: “(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.” 
Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). 
 “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the 
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 
27, 32 (2000)).  “Abuse of discretion occurs if a sentence imposed is 
unreasonable, but a sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary, at the time 
of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.”   
State v. Lawrence, 107 Idaho 867, 868, 693 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Ct. App. 1984) 




not required to assess or balance all of the sentencing goals in an equal 
manner.”  State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 276, 245 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
 In imposing sentence, the district court specifically considered: (1) the four 
goals of sentencing (Tr., p. 22, L. 20 – p. 23, L. 4); (2) mitigating factors such as 
Miller’s acceptance of responsibility, albeit only after he was confronted by family 
members (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 5-23); (3) the circumstances of the crime, including the 
trust Miller betrayed by sexually abusing his granddaughters and the harm he 
caused them (Tr., p. 23, L. 24 – p. 24, L. 9); (4) Miller’s lack of a criminal record, 
although this was less mitigating because such sex crimes are often hidden (Tr., 
p. 24, Ls. 9-16); and (5) that Miller had suffered no prior sexual victimization and 
had not acted under the influence (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 17-22).  After looking “at all 
those things” the district court concluded “there has to be some punishment.”  
(Tr., p. 24, L. 23 – p. 25, L. 2.)  In addition, the sentence should include a 
“message that you can’t hurt children.”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 2-3.)  The district court 
then rejected probation (including retained jurisdiction) and imposed a sentence 
of 12 years with two years determinate, which was “less” than it “might impose” if 
Miller “hadn’t taken responsibility.”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 4-20.)  This record shows no 
abuse of discretion. 
 Miller argues: 
This sentence violates the established law in Idaho and as reflected 
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that “retribution is not to be 
the dominant objective of criminal law”, but there is to be a 
balanced approach considering those other three (3) factors 





(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  This argument fails for two reasons. 
 First, it fails because Miller’s counsel simply fabricated the legal standard 
he quotes above.  The actual quote is: “‘Retribution is no longer the dominant 
objective of the criminal law ….’”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)1 
(“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.  Reformation 
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence.”)).  By changing “no longer” to “not to be” Miller’s counsel 
substantively changed the meaning of the quote. 
This change in meaning is unsupported.  In Gregg, the precedent Miller’s 
counsel apparently relies on even though his quote is fabricated, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, addressing the constitutionality of capital punishment, 
stated: “The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: 
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  428 U.S. 
at 183.  The Court stated that retribution “serves an important purpose.”  Id. 
(internal quotes omitted).  “When people begin to believe that organized society 
is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
                                            
1 In Williams the Court addressed the constitutionality of a district court 
considering a PSI at sentencing where the defendant claimed that evidence 
gathered outside the court and not subject to confrontation could not be 
considered as a matter of due process.  The Court ultimately held the procedure 
did comply with due process because the district court properly considered facts 
beyond those underlying the crime in order that “the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime.”  Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.  Thus, because 
sentencing courts consider factors related to the defendant and not just his 
crime, retribution was “no longer” the dominant consideration in criminal law.  Id. 
at 248-49.  The Court did not, however, state that a sentence could not be based 




‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, 
and lynch law.”  Id. (internal quotes omitted).  “Retribution is no longer the 
dominant objective of the criminal law, but neither is it a forbidden objective nor 
one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.”  Id. (internal quotes and 
citation omitted).  Ultimately the legislative decision to make the death penalty 
applicable to murder in certain situations, based on purposes of retribution and 
deterrence, did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 183-87.  Certainly if 
retribution and deterrence are under some circumstances sufficient to support 
the death penalty, they are sufficient to support the two-year fixed sentence for 
Miller’s repeated sexual abuse of his eight-year-old granddaughters in this case.  
Gregg does not impose a legal prohibition against retribution being the “dominant 
objective” in sentencing, and Miller’s counsel had to fabricate a quote to make it 
seem so. 
 The actual law does not support Miller’s argument.  As set forth above, 
retribution is an acceptable goal of sentencing, and a sentencing court “is not 
required to assess or balance all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner.”  
State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 276, 245 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Ct. App. 2010).  
“‘[P]unishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.’”  Hall v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (brackets original, emphasis added) (quoting 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)).  Even if retribution were the 
“dominant” consideration by the trial court, such would not be an abuse of 




Second, Miller’s argument is not supported by the record.  The district 
court specifically considered all four goals of sentencing: protection of society, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.  (Tr., p. 22, L. 25 – p. 23, L. 4.)  The first 
factor the district court considered was rehabilitation, engaging in an explanation 
about how Miller’s acceptance of responsibility and voluntary participation in 
counselling was mitigating, but the mitigation was offset by the fact he accepted 
responsibility and entered counselling only after being confronted by family 
members and not before the sexual abuse was repeated.  (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 9-23.)  
The district court ultimately identified this factor as the reason it gave a lesser 
amount of prison time than it might otherwise have done.  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 10-20.)  
As noted above, the district court in fact considered many aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in the context of the four goals of sentencing.  (Tr., 
p. 22, L. 20 – p. 25, L. 20.)  The record simply does not support Miller’s claim that 
retribution was the “dominant” factor at sentencing. 
Ultimately Miller argues that the district court gave retribution too much 
weight.  However, his crime was indeed serious and caused a great deal of 
harm.  This was properly considered and within the discretion of the district court.  







Miller Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying The Rule 35 Motion 
 
 A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for 
leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  State v. Knighton, 
143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006). To show a district court abused its 
discretion in denying a Rule 35 motion, an appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information provided to the district court 
in support of the motion.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484-85, 272 P.3d 
417, 456-57 (2012); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 
(2007).  Here Miller does not claim he submitted new or additional information 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 12), and the record does not disclose any new information 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Miller’s sentence and 
the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
 DATED this 17th day of November, 2016. 
 
      /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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